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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE RECORD AND MARSHALED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATE THAT
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH MS.
SPURGERS' CONVICTION FOR RETAIL THEFT BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL THAT SHE
TOOK, CARRIED AWAY, OR TRANSFERRED ANY STORE
MERCHANDISE.

Layton City argues that Ms. Spurgers failed to both marshal
the evidence and present the facts in a light most favorable to
See

the verdict.

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, pp. 7-10.x

This argument is without merit for the reasons set forth below.
When
w

challenging

the

sufficiency

of

the

evidence,

a

*[d]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that

supports the
viewed

[court's conviction], and then showing that, when

in the

light most

favorable

evidence is insuf f icient. '"

State

to the
v Hayes,

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Vigil,
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied,

[conviction] , the
860 P. 2d 968, 972
840 P.2d 788, 793

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).

This case, contrary to Layton City's claim, is not a case where
the defendant's brief is "devoid of any mention of the evidence
supporting"

the

trial

court's

conviction"

or

an

attempt

to

throughout the course of its Brief, Layton City inaccurately
cites the Court to various portions of the record on appeal. For
example, on page 9 of its Brief, Layton City cites to n R10" for the
proposition that "Mervyn's employees cleared the dressing room of all
clothing and other items immediately prior to Defendant entering the
dressing room." This R. 10 citation, however, is actually page 2 of
Defendant's Motion and Affidavit for Waiver of Court Fees, which is
set forth at R. 9-13. See also the Record Index on appeal at R. 60.
1

"reargue defendant's case by recounting a version of the facts
most favorable to defendant . . . ."
P. 2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Cf.

State

v. Scheel,

823

Instead, Ms. Spurgers, in the

course of her Brief, marshals all of the evidence in support of
the

conviction,

including

circumstantial

evidence,

and

then

demonstrates that, based upon this evidence, Layton City failed to
prove

that

she

was

Appellant, p. 11, et

guilty

of

retail

theft.

See

Brief

of

seq.

In its Brief, Layton City, for the most part, accurately
articulates the question presented in this case, namely, "whether
Defendant took possession of, concealed or carried away or caused
to be carried away or transferred some merchandise for Mervyn's .
. ." and whether that "was proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

See

Plaintiff and Appellee, p. II.2 While reviewing courts,

Brief of
2

The relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602, for purposes
of this appeal, provides as follows:
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he
[or she] knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away,
transfers or causes to be carried away or transferred,
any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for
sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the
intention of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without
paying the retail value of such merchandise; . . .
•

*

*

*

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1).
2

in cases such as this, usually sustain the trial court's judgment
unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, there must
be "some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably
be made . . ."

See State v. Boss,

(citing State v.

1236

Mead,

2005 UT App 520, f9, 127 P.3d

2001 UT 58, %61 f

27 P.3d

1115).

Moreover, "before [a reviewing court] can uphold a conviction it
must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element
of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its
conclusion

of

Andreason,

2001 UT App 395, %4, 38 P. 3d 982

Larsen,

guilt

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt."

2000 UT App 106, flO, 999 P. 2d 1252) .

State

(citing State

v.
v.

So, according to

constitutionally based principles, "[c]riminal convictions cannot
rest on conjecture or supposition; they must be established by
See State

proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
981,

987

(Utah 1993)

(noting that

v. Workman,

the State's

852 P.2d

argument

that

"speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable
doubt

is

to

attack

one

of

the

most

sacred

constitutional

safeguards at its core").
The evidence presented by Layton City in this case "was so
slight

and

unconvincing

unreasonable and unjust."
P. 2d 565.

that

it

See State

makes
v. Heaps,

the

verdict

plainly

2000 UT 5, fl9, 999

This Court cannot determine that the trier of fact,
3

acting

as

a

reasonable

person,

could

have

found

beyond

a

reasonable doubt that Ms. Spurgers committed the crime of retail
theft.

Layton City does not simply prevail in the instant case by

putting on some evidence that is more convincing than that of
Defendant.

Rather, it must prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt, irrespective of what the Defendant presents at trial.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.3

See

The record adequately demonstrates

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
Ms. Spurgers' conviction of retail theft.

To affirm Ms. Spurgers'

conviction would be to accept the most speculative of evidence.
In fact, the Loss Prevention Supervisor in the instant case
was

so unsure

that

Ms. Spurgers

had

taken

or

concealed

any

merchandise on her person, that the Supervisor refused to detain
either Ms. Spurgers or her mother prior to them leaving the store
despite several opportunities to do so.
3

Cf.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b)
The
culpable
mental
state
required.

4

6-603 (authorizing any merchant who has probable cause to believe
that a person has committed retail theft to detain that person). 4
Contrary

to

Layton

City's

argument,

the

most

reasonable

of

inferences is that the Loss Prevention Supervisor chose not to
detain Ms. Spurgers because there simply was no evidence, let
alone probable cause to believe, that she had taken or concealed
any merchandise.

The store's video surveillance camera recording,

which was probably the most critical piece of evidence at trial,
fails to demonstrate that any clothing was taken by Ms. Spurgers.
Further, no clothing was ever recovered, and neither Ms. Spurgers
nor her mother confessed to the alleged crime.

In fact, Ms.

Spurgers readily denied taking anything from the store both when
questioned

on the telephone by Officer Jones and during her

testimony at trial.
As demonstrated by the lack of evidence at trial, Layton City
failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is
required to do.
evidence

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.

supporting

the retail theft

A review of the

conviction

leads to the

reasonable and logical conclusion that Ms. Spurgers7 conviction
was based on conjecture or supposition, which does not constitute

4

Layton City argues that the Loss Prevention Supervisor's
decision to not detain Ms. Spurgers was based on company policy. See
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, p. 14. However, no company policy
was presented during trial.
5

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, reversal of the retail

theft conviction for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate
in the instant case.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Spurgers respectfully
requests that this Court reverse her conviction of retail theft
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
Court's determination.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\jL

daf o£\ April, 2010
WIGGINS, P.C.

Wigqi*ls
f o f ^ p p e 11 ant
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ADDENDA
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a) (11) .
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